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Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 – a global animal health crisis:
Profound challenges to science
and society
The first Asian H5N1 highly patho-genic avian influenza (HPAI) strainemerged in 1996 when it was iden-
tified in geese in Guangdong Province in
southern China. Since then the disease
spread widely, initially through East and
South East Asia, in 2003/4, and then into
Mongolia, southern Russia, the Middle
East and to Europe, Africa and South Asia
in 2005/6. Migratory birds appear to
have played a role in some of these
movements.
During this time avian influenza has at-
tracted very considerable public and me-
dia attention because the viruses involved
produced fatal zoonotic disease in a small
number of humans exposed to the viruses
and because of the potential to acquire
the capacity to be transmitted from
humans to humans, a prerequisite for a
human pandemic strain. Although the
possibility exists that avian influenza
caused by H5N1 viruses leads to a global
influenza pandemic, H5N1 has not yet
been found to be easily transmissible
from birds to humans and even less, if at
all, among humans.
The impact of the disease and
of its control
With the fear of the spread of avian
influenza many decision makers are ask-
ing how to best prevent the introduction
of HPAI to their country or if it is already in
their country how to prevent further
spread and having it become endemic.
Emergency control measures to eliminate
new outbreaks of HPAI and to stop the
spread of the disease have centred on
stamping out which may entail the large
scale culling of infected flocks and contact
flocks. The high concentration of poultry
in certain areas has led to the culling of
millions of animals at great expense
(Brahmbhatt, Avian and human pandemic
influenza – economic and social impacts.
World Bank, 2005). For low income coun-
tries in which poultry is raised primarily by
smallholders who can generate important
income from raising birds, such measures
may seriously threaten smallholder poul-
try operations.
The H5N1 highly
pathogenic avian
influenza epizootic is a
serious multi-
dimensional challenge
to agriculture, rural
development and
public health and
requires high multi-
sectoral attention for
its solution. Many
drivers of the crisis are
insufficiently known
which renders its
technically and socially
successful containment
rather difficult. In this
article some of these
elements are
highlighted as are the
main actions
undertaken by the UN’s
Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) in
support of its member
countries.
For those countries with a large number
of backyard producers, poultry production
is an important contributor to the liveli-
hood of many poor households. Further,
poultry meat and eggs are important
sources of essential micronutrients for the
poor, children and women, and it is known
that in general small animal husbandry is
positively associated with intake of ani-
mal source foods. The economic and nutri-
tional losses faced by poor producers in
these countries, depending on the strate-
gy chosen to control HPAI, could be devas-
tating, as would be the accelerated loss of
animal genetic diversity.
Though the viruses have had a significant
impact on producers, and in particular on
backyard producers, the direct cost of the
disease has been dwarfed by the devas-
tating impact on poultry producers glob-
ally caused by market shocks driven large-
ly by misplaced public fears regarding
safety of poultry products. These con-
cerns, fuelled in part by the media, have
led to a marked fall in sales and prices for
poultry products.
Controversy about origin and
spread of the disease
There are a range of unresolved questions
regarding the emergence and spread of
H5N1 HPAI since 1996. One school of
thought suggests that rapidly expanding
intensive or industrial farming has played a
pivotal role whereas others see this largely
as a disease of smallholder poultry, brought
about by failure or inability to implement
appropriate biosecurity / quality manage-
ment systems as smallholder flocks
expanded. FAO argues that both have
played a role and any attempt to blame a
particular practice or sector for emergence
of this disease fails to recognize the com-
plexity of the poultry industry and the pit-
falls and benefits of the various manage-
ment systems employed from a veterinary,
social and economic perspective.
The crucial role of ducks in open farming
systems and of live bird markets as reser-
voirs of infection also needs to be recog-
nized as well as ways by which these risks
are managed or have failed to be managed.
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A worldwide growing and
changing poultry sector 
Rearing of poultry has long played and
continues to play a crucial role in rural de-
velopment due to the relatively low entry
cost and the potentially high returns for
smallholders who expand their flocks.
Many smallholders have responded to
increased market demands created by
large urban centres by rearing additional
poultry but are now finding that rapid
expansion of their flocks without concur-
rent investments in measures to prevent
disease, such as enhancement of biosecu-
rity, has left them vulnerable to disease.
Even smallholders with uninfected flocks
have been affected as a result of market
shocks when avian influenza occurred, as
the public and authorities demanded
infection free produce grown under
«safe» certifiable conditions.
FAO argues that the very dynamic growth
of the poultry industry world-wide, but
particularly in regions which are lacking
the scale of veterinary infrastructure
needed to monitor and protect animal
health has created a ‘time bomb’ that
‘exploded’ when H5N1 HPAI, a highly
transmissible disease of public health sig-
nificance, emerged. All poultry producers
were affected by market crashes but
those with sub-standard disease preven-
tion programmes paid a particularly high
price for their failure or inability to imple-
ment such measures. Some of these pro-
ducers will never return to poultry produc-
tion and those that remain may no longer
have access to markets they relied upon
before the outbreaks occurred.
Insufficient veterinary 
support systems
FAO has long noted with concern the
rapid expansion of the poultry industry
without the required veterinary support
systems; this concern also relates to the
growth of practices such as free grazing
duck production in association with pad-
dy rice systems and to the rearing of
domestic birds over ponds in fast expand-
ing aquaculture systems. FAO considers
that such practices may be ecologically
and economically sound but some of
these production systems, in particular
free grazing ducks, have now proven to be
reservoirs of H5N1 virus (Gilbert et al.,
Free-grazing ducks and highly pathogenic
avian influenza, Thailand, 2006). There-
fore additional measures, such as effec-
tive duck vaccines and easy-to-apply vac-
cination technologies, need to be imple-
mented for these important production
systems to be safe and sustainable.
It is perhaps too easy to blame veterinary
authorities for failing to impose tighter
standards on producers when viewing
events in retrospect, as the political will to
implement necessary actions usually only
materializes after major shocks have
occurred that convert potential problems
to real ones. Similarly it is rather easy to
blame governments and donors for spon-
soring programmes in many developing
countries to encourage poultry raising as
a viable income earning activity for rural
populations; it is certain, though, that
such programmes with their direct bene-
fits particularly for women and children in
terms of livelihoods and access to micro-
nutrients (The World Hunger Project, 2005)
need to be associated with the strength-
ening of disease prevention capabilities.
Although it is recognized that intensively
reared poultry can play a role in the emer-
gence of highly pathogenic avian influen-
za viruses, these farms can also remain
largely uninfected in the face of infection
in other production sectors through rigor-
ous implementation of biosecurity and
other disease prevention measures. This
has been demonstrated in Thailand and
Hong Kong SAR where poultry have been
reared successfully in intensive farms
despite the presence of virus outside
these farms.
Live bird markets, existing in most poultry
farming communities, have been blamed
for maintaining and spreading infection
and there is little doubt that they pose
major challenges to veterinary authori-
ties, as seen in experiences from the US
and Hong Kong. It has proven difficult to
keep avian influenza viruses out of such
markets, reason for which their continued
operation is questioned by some experts
and policy makers.
Strengthening advice on safe
and equitable 
sector development
Achieving an appropriate balance
between the benefits of enhanced biose-
curity, the risks associated with creating
large susceptible populations of poultry in
industrial scale farms, providing con-
sumers with affordable food and protect-
ing the livelihood of poor smallholders
and villagers and conserving valuable
poultry genetic diversity is perhaps the
greatest challenge facing authorities
when making decisions relating to control
of H5N1 HPAI. FAO’s animal health pro-
gramme continues to work in order to
better understand the global epidemiolo-
gy of the disease and to define the best
strategies for prevention and control. To
ensure that these strategies are socially
and economically sound, FAO has set up a
dedicated group of professionals to care-
fully analyse socio-economic impacts of
the disease and of disease control mea-
sures and to advise countries and donors
on the management of the challenges
associated with control of this disease vis-
à-vis the current and future structure of
the poultry industry (McLeod et al., Eco-
nomic and social impacts of avian influen-
za, FAO, 2005).
The current HPAI H5N1 crisis poses a possi-
bly unprecedented challenge to the scien-
tific community, both biological and
social, to work together to bring the
understanding of the socio-economic
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Smallholder backyard poultry
systems – under long-term
pressure by HPAI?
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impacts of efforts to control HPAI to the
forefront of the public and private debate.
The question is how best to do this so that
the risks and pathways of spread, the
socio-economic impacts of control mea-
sures, and cost-effective control measures
can be identified to minimize the nega-
tive impact on the poor while successfully
containing the HPAI threat. More research
has to be done to explain all the determi-
nants of the epidemiology of the disease
and to develop better tools, such as vac-
cines, and strategies to prevent and con-
trol avian influenza. Nevertheless, it needs
to be recognized that decision makers will
have to cope with making decisions under
uncertainty for some time to come in that
they will not have all the information they
need about the disease when implement-
ing control strategies and may need to
modify these as new information be-
comes available.
FAO’s response to avian
influenza  
FAO is committed to continue supporting
such complex decision making; the Or-
ganization is, at the request of its member
countries, endeavouring to assemble all
available and relevant scientific and tech-
nical resources so as to contribute to the
strengthening of the role of the livestock
sector to ensure global food security
while enhancing poverty alleviation, pub-
lic health and the sustainability of the
natural resource base, including animal
genetic diversity, used in such production.
Since early 2004, when several Asian
countries almost simultaneously reported
outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian
influenza H5N1, FAO has worked with
affected and at risk countries in Asia, East-
ern Europe, Middle East, Caucasus, Africa,
Latin America and the Caribbean to facili-
tate information sharing, networking and
with its broad operational experience and
expertise (see also box on page 19).
FAO has supported countries in designing
and implementing emergency and mid-
to long-term national control strategies,
reviewing human capacity, infrastructure
and policies for avian influenza surveil-
lance, detection and control, assessing the
socio-economic consequences of the
crises as well as costs and consequences
of control measures and various attempts
of rehabilitation and long-term restruc-
turing of the poultry sector. FAO also
maintains an information service on the
evolution of the crisis and of actions
undertaken world-wide.
FAO and OIE have prepared jointly a Glob-
al Plan for the progressive control of HPAI;
they have established the OIE-FAO Avian
Influenza network (OFFLU) designed to
coordinate research, provide confirmatory
diagnosis, support countries through pro-
vision of experts and interface with WHO
in the analysis of virus strains.
The avian influenza early warning activi-
ties at the global level are the joint con-
cern of FAO, OIE and WHO, working
together in a Global Early Warning (and
Response) System (GLEWS), based at FAO
Rome, for transboundary animal diseases
and emerging zoonoses.
FAO has assumed, in the UN-wide Avian
and Pandemic Influenza Coordination set
up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in
September 2005, the leading role as the
specialized UN organization in charge of
assisting member states in controlling the
disease at source in the animal.
_______________________________
This contribution was prepared using a
major review on The relationship between
avian influenza, different mechanisms of
viral spread and persistence, and the struc-
ture of the poultry industry by C. Narrod, L.
Sims, A. J. Slingenbergh, McLeod (forth-
coming).
capacity building, using FAO’s own funds
and increasingly supported by extra-bud-
getary financial contributions from multi-
and bilateral donors. The primary objec-
tive of these operations was and contin-
ues to be the strengthening of disease
intelligence and emergency prepared-
ness, the examination of the role of
migratory birds in the disease spread, the
support of broad awareness creation and
of risk communication, the analysis of and
advice on social and economic conse-
quences of both the disease and its con-
trol, the strengthening of field surveil-
lance and laboratory capabilities, and of
global avian influenza surveillance and
early warning capabilities. FAO fielded,
often together with OIE (Office Interna-
tional des Epizooties / World Organization
for Animal Health), WHO (World Health
Organization), WB (World Bank) and EC
(European Commission), 106 and 166 mis-
sions respectively in 2004 and 2005 in
support of affected and at-risk countries.
In the first six months of 2006, a further
159 missions were carried out to help set
up and sustain local, national, regional
and global action. By mid 2006, FAO has
raised US Dollar 130 million in support of
national, regional and global action
against this dangerous disease. FAO has
so far provided HPAI control and prepared-
ness support in terms of services and/or
supplies to 95 countries.
FAO established, in 2004, the Emergency
Centre for Transboundary Animal Disease
Operations (ECTAD), a corporate platform
for the integrated delivery of FAO’s live-
stock programme related to animal
health crises such as avian influenza; this
mechanism combines the technical ani-
mal health programme design responsi-
bilities of FAO’s Animal Production and
Health Division under the leadership of
FAO’s Chief Veterinary Officer with the
programme delivery capabilities of FAO’s
Emergency and Rehabilitation Division
A worker collects eggs
at a well protected
chicken farm. How can
smallholders keep
pace?
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